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As we confront the challenges of the "War on Terrorism," it is useful to look back
at our own history to understand how in past crises we have struck the balance
between liberty and security. In this Essay, Professor Geoffrey Stone considers
how Abraham Lincoln dealt with the conflict between free expression and military
necessity during the course of the Civil War. Although we tend to think of
Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus as the paramount civil liberties issue in this
era (apart from slavery), Professor Stone explores how Lincoln, facing often severe
criticism of his administration, struggled to balance free speech rights against the
imperiled security of the Union.
INTRODUCTION
To comprehend the free speech issues that arose during the Civil
War, it is necessary to have some sense of the extraordinary situation
facing Lincoln. Lincoln not only was confronted with the issues that
are inevitable in a civil war-such as sharply divided loyalties, fluid
and often uncertain military and political boundaries, and easy oppor-
tunities for espionage and sabotage-but he also faced special dilem-
mas arising out of the war between the states. These involved the
explosive issues of race, slavery, and emancipation, the nation's first
experience with conscription, the challenge of winning reelection, and
* Harry Kalven, Jr. Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of
Chicago. I would like to thank Shana Wallace for her splendid research assistance and the
Harry Kalven, Jr. Faculty Research Fund for financial support. I am very grateful to
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the public uncertainty whether, as Horace Greeley advised, the North
should just "let 'the erring sisters' go in peace."' Moreover, although
opposition to a war was not new to the United States, the limits of
permissible dissent were as yet undefined, thus posing added difficul-
ties both for the administration and its critics.
Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation generated vehement oppo-
sition. The antiwar Democrats, or "Copperheads, '' 2 opposed the
Proclamation because, in their view, it fundamentally transformed the
purpose of the war. The goal was now to destroy the old South rather
than to restore the Union. The Copperheads made this the central
issue of the 1862 elections. They denounced the Proclamation, declar-
ing that there must be "no more bloodshed to gratify a religious fanat-
icism."'3 A mass meeting of New York Democrats resolved that the
war "against the South is illegal .. and should not be sustained."'4
Governor Seymour of New York condemned emancipation as
"bloody" and "barbarous."'5 Other Democratic newspapers charged
that the Proclamation violated the Constitution and the law of na-
tions, that it would lead to a "dark future," and that it would render
"the restoration of the old Constitution and Union impossible." '6
Many Union soldiers shared this view. As one volunteer wrote to his
fianc6e: "It is not for the emancipation of the African race I fight. I
want nothing to do with the negro. I want them as far from me as is
possible to conceive." 7
The challenge of raising an army also posed a serious obstacle for
the administration. The attack on Fort Sumter ignited the North and
brought forth a flood of enlistments. But as casualty lists lengthened
and the grim realities of combat set in, many states had to resort to
I Frank L. Klement, The Limits of Dissent: Clement L. Vallandigham and the Civil
War 45 (1970) (citing N.Y. Trib., Nov. 9, 1860, at 4).
2 The term "Copperhead" was originally coined as an epithet to liken the Democrats
to the venomous snake. After several years, the Democrats proudly accepted the label and
began wearing badges that resembled copper pennies. See James M. McPherson, Battle
Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era 494 n.8 (1988); Charles H. Coleman, The Use of the
Term "Copperhead" During the Civil War, 25 Miss. Valley Hist. Rev. 263 (1938); Albert
Matthews, Origin of Butternut and Copperhead, reprinted in 20 The Publications of the
Colonial Society of Massachusetts 205 (1918).
3 Klement, supra note 1, at 106-07.
4 Wood Gray, The Hidden Civil War: The Story of the Copperheads 146-47 (1974);
McPherson, supra note 2, at 592.
5 Governor Horatio Seymour, Annual Message to the Legislature (1863), in 5
Messages from the Governors 445, 482 (Charles Z. Lincoln ed., 1909), cited in William B.
Hesseltine, Lincoln and the War Governors 284 (1948); see also McPherson, supra note 2,
at 595.
6 David H. Donald, Lincoln 380 (1995) (quoting Spirit of the Press, N.Y. Evening Ex-
press, Sept. 23, 1862).
7 J. Matthew Gallman, The North Fights the Civil War: The Home Front 128 (1994).
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conscription to meet their quotas.8 This often triggered violent resis-
tance. Mobs murdered two enrollment officers in Indiana, and the
Army had to send troops into Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Ohio, and In-
diana to restore order.9 On September 24, 1862, Lincoln issued a
proclamation suspending the writ of habeas corpus and declaring mar-
tial law in all of these areas for "all persons discouraging volunteer
enlistments, resisting militia drafts,, or guilty of any disloyal prac-
tice . . . affording aid and comfort to Rebels."' 10 Secretary of War
Stanton arrested and imprisoned hundreds of alleged draft resisters
without the benefit of trial. Protest groups marched under banners
declaring, "We won't fight to free the nigger." 11
The Democratic Party grew stronger with each Confederate vic-
tory, and the adoption of an unprecedented national conscription law
on March 3, 1863 gave the antiwar movement further impetus. 12
Democratic newspapers proclaimed that the draft would force white
working men to fight for the freedom of blacks who would come north
and take away their jobs. 13 The government's often heavy-handed ef-
forts to enforce conscription offended many citizens. Provosts-mar-
tial, charged with carrying out the draft, conducted house-to-house
searches, sentenced drafted boys who failed to report for induction as
"deserters," and used troops to break up anti-draft demonstrations. 14
These factors combined to ignite even more violent protests in
the hot summer of 1863. Mobs killed several enrollment officers, and
anti-draft, anti-black violence erupted in many Northern cities, includ-
ing Boston and Newark. 15 In July, four days of draft rioting in New
York City left 105 people dead. 16 Led by Irish immigrants, it was the
worst riot in American history. A black orphanage was burned to the
8 McPherson, supra note 2, at 490-93.
9 Id. at 493.
10 Abraham Lincoln, Proclamation Suspending the Writ of Habeas Corpus (Sept. 24,
1862), [hereinafter Lincoln, Proclamation], in 5 The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln
436, 437 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
11 Robert E. Sterling, Civil War Draft Resistance in the Middle West 96-97 (1975) (un-
published Ph.D. dissertation, Northern Illinois University), cited in McPherson, supra note
2, at 493.
12 Alexis de Tocqueville had predicted that the United States would never use conscrip-
tion: "In America conscription is unknown and men are induced to enlist by bounties. The
notions and habits of the people.., are so opposed to compulsory recruiting that I do not
think it can ever be sanctioned by the laws." Alexis de Tocqueville, 1 Democracy in
America 228 (Phillips Bradley ed., Vintage Books 1990) (1834); see also McPherson, supra
note 2, at 605.
13 McPherson, supra note 2, at 609.
14 Shelby Foote, A Civil War Narrative 635 (1963).
15 McPherson, supra note 2, at 609-10; see generally Adrian Cook, The Armies of the
Streets: The New York City Draft Riots of 1863 (1974).
16 Cook, supra note 15, at 193-94; McPherson, supra note 2, at 609-10.
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ground, black homes were destroyed, and blacks were beaten and
lynched on lampposts. 17
To add to these problems, General Meade's failure at Gettysburg
to follow up on his victory by cutting off and destroying Lee's retreat-
ing army left Lincoln despondent. As Lincoln wrote Meade: "I do
not believe you appreciate the magnitude of the misfortune involved
in Lee's escape. He was within your easy grasp, and to have closed
upon him would ... have ended the war. As it is, the war will be
prolonged indefinitely." Lincoln's recognition that he had failed to
win the war on the field heightened his "fear that.., he might [soon]
lose it on the home front."'18 This concern was by no means
unfounded. 19
Lincoln told Senator Charles Sumner that he was more worried
about "the fire in the rear" (meaning the Democrats) than about "our
military chances. o20 There were many signs to support this concern.
The Republican Governor of Indiana, for example, warned the Secre-
tary of War that the Democratic legislatures of both Indiana and Illi-
nois were threatening to pass resolutions "acknowledging the
Southern Confederacy and urging the States of the Northwest to dis-
solve all constitutional relations with the New England States."'21
Richard Dana, author of Two Years Before the Mast, a founder of the
Free Soil Party, and an ardent Republican, wrote from Washington
that "the most striking thing is the absence of personal loyalty to the
President. It does not exist. He has no admirers, no enthusiastic sup-
porters, none to bet on his head. If a Republican convention were to
be held tomorrow, he would not get the vote of a State. '22
It was against this background that Lincoln faced one of the most
dramatic confrontations over free speech in our nation's history.
17 Cook, supra note 15, at 77-80, 139-43, 194-96; McPherson, supra note 2, at 609-10; see
also Gallman, supra note 7, at 147-48; Robert S. Harper, Lincoln and the Press 270-76
(1951).
The Confederacy initiated conscription a year earlier, in March 1862. This prompted
violent protests in the South as well as in the North. Several times during the war,
Jefferson Davis declared martial law and suspended the writ of habeas corpus. Protests
against martial law were so vehement, however, that the Confederate Congress withdrew
from President Davis the authority to suspend the writ of habeas corpus only sixteen
months into the war. See McPherson, supra note 2, at 428-36.
18 Foote, supra note 14, at 627-28.
19 See id. at 628.
20 Id. at 629.
21 Id.
22 Id.
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I
CLEMENT VALLANDIGHAM AND GENERAL ORDER No. 38
In March 1863, Lincoln appointed General Ambrose Burnside
Union Commander of the Department of Ohio. Still smarting from
his defeat at Fredericksburg and his dismissal as commander of the
Army of the Potomac, Burnside was determined that no carelessness
on his part would lead to any new disaster.23 He "soon became con-
cerned about disloyal persons residing within the Union lines who
were thought to be giving information and other aid and comfort to
the enemy. '' 24 Burnside was appalled to discover that "newspapers
were full of treasonable expressions" and that "large public meetings
were held, at which our Government authorities and our gallant
soldiers in the field were openly and loudly denounced for their ef-
forts to suppress the rebellion. '25
Although Burnside had no comprehension of the causes of disaf-
fection in this part of the nation,2 6 he fully appreciated the efficacy of
force. Thus, in April, Burnside declared martial law27 and issued Gen-
eral Order No. 38, which announced, among other things, that "[t]he
habit of declaring sympathies for the enemy will not be allowed in this
Department. ' 28 In so doing, Burnside established himself as the ulti-
23 See William H. Rehnquist, All the Laws but One: Civil Liberties in Wartime 64
(1998).
24 Id.
25 General Report No. 2: Report of Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside (Nov. 13, 1865),
in 23 The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and
Confederate Armies, ser. 1, pt. 1, at 12, 12 (Washington, D.C., Gov't Printing Office, 1889);
see Craig D. Tenney, To Suppress or Not to Suppress: Abraham Lincoln and the Chicago
Times, in 27 Civil War History 248, 249 (1981) (quoting Burnside's report).
26 Although westerners (during the Civil War the "West" consisted of what we would
today consider the Midwest) had enthusiastically supported Lincoln at the outset of the
war, they suffered huge losses in the first two years of the conflict, and many had grown
disillusioned. The 1863 conscription law promised to have an especially severe effect on
western farmers. Moreover, the West had not shared in the general prosperity that the war
economy had brought to the Northeast. Perhaps most importantly, few westerners were
abolitionists. They did not support the Emancipation Proclamation and feared that eman-
cipation would lead to a heavy migration of freed blacks to the states of the West. See
Donald, supra note 6, at 417-18.
27 According to Chief Justice Rehnquist:
Whatever the theory of martial law might be, its consequences ... during the
Civil War were quite apparent. Statements critical of the government, whether
appearing in the press or made in the course of political oratory, were pun-
ished by fine and imprisonment. Homes of suspects could be broken into with-
out warrants. And none of this was in accordance with laws enacted by any
legislature or city council. Martial law was the voice of whichever general was
in command.
Rehnquist, supra note 23, at 73-74.
28 General Order No. 38, Apr. 13, 1863, in The Trial of Hon. Clement L. Vallandigham
by a Military Commission 7, 7 (Cincinnati, Rickey and Carroll 1863) Ihereinafter
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mate arbiter of "treasonable expressions. ' 29 Burnside's issuance of
General Order No. 38 was the impetus for what turned out to be the
Civil War's most celebrated arrest and prosecution for disloyal speech.
A. "Mr. V."
Clement Vallandigham was one of the most forceful champions of
the Copperheads. Tall, young, handsome, and a gifted public speaker,
Vallandigham was a strong supporter of popular sovereignty as the
best way to preserve the Union. He saw abolitionists as Jacobins who
were determined to destroy the comity of the nation's diverse sec-
tions. He thought that abolitionist clergymen should stay out of polit-
ics and that politicians should not be in the business of interpreting
Christian doctrine. 30
A staunch advocate of the Jeffersonian philosophy of a limited
federal government, Vallandigham argued that Congress should "not
meddle with slavery either in the states where it exists or in the terri-
tories." 31 He attacked Republicans for their contempt for the Consti-
tution and their advocacy that the cause of abolition rose above the
law. Such lawlessness, he stressed, "only bred more lawlessness. '32
After the final meeting of Congress before Lincoln's inauguration,
Vallandigham, then a Congressman from Ohio, wistfully wrote his
wife that it had been a day of "tribulation and anguish," concluding
that "[w]hen the secession has taken place, I shall do all in my power
first to restore the Union, if it be possible; and failing in that, then to
mitigate the evils of disruption. '33
Once war broke upon the nation, Vallandigham scathingly op-
posed the war, the draft, the military arrest of civilians, suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus, and the Emancipation Proclamation. Even
though the South had fired the first shot at Fort Sumter, Vallandigham
Vallandigham Trial], quoted and discussed in Michael Kent Curtis, Free Speech, "The Peo-
ple's Darling Privilege": Struggles for Freedom of Expression in American History 307-08
(2000). A similar order was issued by General Milo Hascall in Indiana. See Curtis, supra,
at 308-09; Harper, supra note 17, at 251-57. Burnside's order was based on Lincoln's sus-
pension of the writ of habeas corpus in Missouri in September 1862, when he declared that
"during the existing insurrection and as a necessary measure for suppressing the same...
all persons discouraging volunteer enlistments ... or guilty of any disloyal practice.., shall
be subject to martial law." Lincoln, Proclamation, supra note 10, at 437.
29 Tenney, supra note 25, at 249-50.
30 Klement, supra note 1, at 18-19.
31 Id. at 19 (citing Dayton Daily Empire, Oct. 30, 1855: Nov. 21, 1855).
32 Id.
33 James L. Vallandigham, A Life of Clement L. Vallandigham 144 (Baltimore, Turnbull
Bros. 1872) (reproducing letter from Clement L. Vallandigham to Louisa A. Vallandigham,
written on December 3, 1860); see also Klement, supra note 1, at 48 (quoting from same
letter).
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blamed Lincoln and the abolitionists for causing the war.34 He argued
that "the Southern states could not be forced back into a Union they
abhorred. '35 A "true nation," he explained, "must be built upon good
will and trust, not on force, distrust and self-styled superiority. '36 He
wrote pessimistically that events had proceeded so far that it may be
"too late for anything except peaceable separation."37
Vallandigham was both admired and reviled for his views. The
Republican press typically cast him as "disloyal," "treasonable," "a
friend of Jeff Davis," "a contemptible traitor," a "pro-slavery apolo-
gist," a "cold-blooded, mean-spirited coward," and a "secessionist. '38
He was compared to Benedict Arnold and Aaron Burr.39 Ohio
Republicans, with the active assistance of President Lincoln and se-
nior members of his cabinet, 40 gerrymandered him into defeat in the
1862 congressional elections, but Vallandigham was not about to leave
quietly. In a farewell speech to the House on January 14, 1863, he set
forth his indictment of the war and his proposals for peace.41
Vallandigham asserted that he was a better Unionist than the
Republicans, who were fighting not for union, but for abolition.42
What, he asked, had they accomplished? He replied: "Let the dead at
34 Klement, supra note 1, at 63.
35 Id. at 67.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 66. Having described Lincoln's struggle between upholding civil liberties and
maintaining the Union, Klement summarizes Vallandigham's position:
Vallandigham ... denied that the Lincoln administration and the government
were one and the same. He claimed he was loyal to the government and the
Constitution and that every effort of Republicans to confine loyalty to a single
pattern, to constrain it to a single formula, was disloyalty to the Constitution
and American tradition. He believed the concept of loyalty as conformity a
false one and he questioned whether radical Republicans (whom he believed
guilty of mockery of the Bill of Rights) had the right to impose their definition
of loyalty upon the country.
Id. at 323.
38 See id. at 63-67, 94, 109-10, 145.
39 Id. at 110. Others who espoused views similar to Vallandigham's were also subjected
to all manner of harassment. See id. at 63-67, 94, 109-10, 145. It is important to note that
Vallandigham was not "pro-slavery." Like Senator Stephen Douglas, he opposed slavery.
But he did not believe that the national government should attempt to impose that view on
those states with a different view.
40 President Lincoln, Secretary of War Stanton and Secretary of the Treasury Chase, a
former Governor of Ohio, all personally worked to persuade General Robert Schenck to
challenge Vallandigham. Id. at 102-05. Lincoln told Schenck that "he could do a greater
service by sidetracking Vallandigham than by leading a brigade on the battlefield" and
assured Schenck of a military promotion. Id. at 105.
41 McPherson, supra note 2, at 591-92; see also Klement, supra note 1, at chs. 1-6.
42 McPherson, supra note 2, at 592.
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Fredericksburg and Vicksburg answer." 43 The solution, he argued,
was to "stop fighting," to "make an armistice," and to initiate immedi-
ate negotiations for reunion. 44 He had no use for the objection that
peace would preserve slavery. "I see more barbarism and
sin .. in the continuance of this war," he observed, than in "the sin
and barbarism of African slavery. ' 45 He argued that "slavery in the
South is a question, not of morals, or religion, or humanity, but a form
of labor, perfectly compatible with the dignity of free white labor in
the same community, and with national vigor, power, and prosper-
ity.' '46 The "grand experiment" of war, he maintained, has resulted in
the "most bloody failure. '47 His prescription for ending the war and
healing the nation was to put an end to "the pestilent Abolition
Rebellion." 48
Although Vallandigham held strong views, he consistently coun-
seled compliance with the law. He argued that "[n]o matter how dis-
tasteful constitutions and laws may be, they must be obeyed. ' 49 In
one address, Vallandigham predicted that men would not enlist to
fight a war for emancipation. "[I]t is easier," he said, "to die at
home."' 50 He then added: "I beg pardon, but I trust I am not 'discour-
aging enlistments.' If I am, then first arrest Lincoln, [Secretary of
War] Stanton, and [General] Halleck," in whose hands the war is "a
most bloody and costly failure"-his implication being that they had
done more to "discourage enlistments" than he could ever do.5 1
In March 1863, Vallandigham made a speech to the Democratic
Union Association in New York during which he denounced the Con-
scription Act and warned that if the President "failed to heed the
wishes of the people, a revolution might visit America.152 The next
day, the New York Times reported that Vallandigham had advocated
resistance to the Conscription Act. Vallandigham immediately wrote
a letter to the editor of the Times denying that he had "counseled
resistance." Correcting the record, he stated:
43 Clement Laird Vallandigham, The Great Civil War in America, Speech in the House
of Representatives (Jan. 14, 1863), in 2 Union Pamphlets of the Civil War, 1861-1865, at
697, 711 (Frank Freidel ed., 1967), cited in McPherson, supra note 2, at 592.
44 Vallandigham, supra note 43, at 732-34.
45 Id. at 718-19.
46 Id. at 719.
47 Id. at 706.
48 Clement Laird Vallandigham, The State of the Country, Speech Delivered in Day-
ton, Ohio (Aug. 2, 1862), in The Record of Hon. C.L. Vallandigham on Abolition, the
Union, and the Civil War 135, 148 (Cincinnati, J. Walter & Co. 1863).
49 Id. at 137, quoted in Curtis, supra note 28, at 304.
50 Foote, supra note 14, at 631.
51 Id.
52 Klement, supra note 1, at 134-35.
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I expressly counseled the trial of all questions of law before the judi-
cial courts, and all questions of politics before the commission of the
ballot-box. I AM FOR OBEDIENCE TO ALL LAWS-obedience
by the people and by the men in power also. I am for a free discus-
sion of all measures and laws whatsoever, as in former times; but
FORCIBLE RESISTANCE TO NONE. The ballot-box, and not
the cartridge-box, is the instrument of reform and revolution .... 53
B. The Arrest of Mr. V.
In April 1863, after the end of his term in Congress,
Vallandigham traveled to Columbus for the state Democratic conven-
tion. He hoped to receive the nomination for Governor, "but was re-
jected by party leaders."' 54 In an effort to advance his languishing
candidacy, Vallandigham decided to challenge General Order No. 38.
His plan was to have himself arrested and then to ride a favorable tide
of public opinion into office.
Thus, on May 1, 1863, Vallandigham addressed a large public
gathering in Mount Vernon, Ohio, "where he defended the right of
people to assemble at any time to hear the policy of the current ad-
ministration debated. ' 55 In this speech, Vallandigham described the
war as "wicked, cruel, and unnecessary"; charged that the administra-
tion could have "honorably terminated" the war "months ago"; de-
picted the conflict as "a war for the freedom of the blacks and the
enslavement of the whites"; characterized General Order No. 38 as a
"base usurpation of arbitrary authority"; and argued that "the sooner
the people inform the minions of usurped power that they will not
submit to such restrictions upon their liberties, the better.
56
Vallandigham asserted that his "right to speak and criticize was based
upon 'General Orders, No. 1.,' The Constitution of the United
States."'57 He concluded that citizens should use "'the ballot-box' to
hurl 'King Lincoln' from his throne. '58 This speech brought rousing
cheers from the crowd, many of whom wore copper Liberty-head pen-
nies in their buttonholes.5 9
53 C.L. Vallandigham, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1863, at 1, quoted in
Klement, supra note 1, at 135.
54 Rehnquist, supra note 23, at 65; see also Klement, supra note 1, at 138-40;
McPherson, supra note 2, at 596-97.
55 Rehnquist, supra note 23, at 65.
56 Curtis, supra note 28, at 310; see also Vallandigham Trial, supra note 28, at 11-12.
This is not a verbatim transcript of the speech, which does not exist, but the specification of
the charge against Vallandigham.
57 Klement, supra note 1, at 154 (reconstructing Vallandigham's speech from accounts
in Mount Vernon Democratic Banner and Vallandigham, supra note 43, at 248-59).
58 Id.
59 See Foote, supra note 14, at 632.
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On May 5, without consulting his superiors, General Burnside or-
dered Union soldiers to arrest Vallandigham. At 2:30 in the morning
they broke down his door, seized him from his bedroom, and carted
him off to a prison in Cincinnati. Vallandigham was then brought
before a five-member military commission and charged with
"[p]ublicly expressing in violation of general orders No. 38,... sympa-
thy for those in arms against the government of the United States, and
declaring disloyal sentiments and opinions with the object and pur-
pose of weakening the power of the government in its efforts to sup-
press an unlawful rebellion." 60
After a two day trial, at which Vallandigham declined to plead
because he denied that the tribunal had any lawful authority over a
civilian, the military commission found Vallandigham guilty as
charged. The commission was unwilling to put Vallandigham before a
firing squad, but it recommended his imprisonment for the duration of
the war. Burnside accepted this recommendation. 61 The General des-
ignated Fort Warren in Boston Harbor as the place of Vallandigham's
incarceration. He explained his actions as follows:
If I were to find a man from the enemy's country distributing in my
camps speeches of their public men that tended to demoralize the
troops, or to destroy their confidence in the constituted authorities
of the government, I would have him tried, and hung if found guilty,
and all the rules of modern warfare would sustain me. Why should
such speeches from our own public men be allowed? ... If the
people do not approve [the government's] policy, they can change
the constitutional authorities of that government, at the proper time
and by the proper method. Let them freely discuss the policy in a
proper tone, but my duty requires me to stop license and intemper-
ate discussion, which tends to weaken the authority of the govern-
ment and army .... There is no fear of the people losing their
liberties; we all know that to be the cry of demagogues, and none
but the ignorant will listen to it.62
60 Ex parte Vallandigham, 28 F. Cas. 874, 875 (C.C.D. Ohio 1863) (No. 16,816). See
Vallandigham, supra note 43, at 254-59, for a vivid account of what was occurring within
Vallandigham's house while the armed soldiers attempted to break down the door and
execute the arrest.
61 McPherson, supra note 2, at 597. One reason the commission did not want to put
him before a firing squad was that they did not want to "make him a martyr." Klement,
supra note 1, at 168.
62 Vallandigham, 28 F. Cas. at 876-77. Chief Justice Rehnquist has neatly described the
difficulties inherent in the prosecution of Vallandigham under martial law:
Vallandigham was not only tried by a military commission, rather than a jury,
but the charge upon which he was tried was that he violated an order issued by
Burnside-an order that forbade the expression of sympathy for the enemy. A
[federal] criminal trial in a civil court must be based on a charge that the defen-
dant engaged in conduct prohibited by an Act of Congress . .. Burnside's
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Vallandigham immediately filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in the local federal district court, arguing that he had been de-
nied due process of law, the right to be tried on the indictment of a
grand jury, the right to a public trial by an impartial jury, the right to
confront the witnesses against him, and the right to have compulsory
process for witnesses in his behalf, all as guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights of the Constitution. Although there was no suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus in effect in this area at this time, Judge
Humphrey H. Leavitt denied Vallandigham's petition.63
Judge Leavitt reasoned that "[t]he court cannot shut its eyes to
the grave fact that war exists, involving the most imminent public dan-
ger, and threatening the subversion and destruction of the constitution
itself."' 64 "Self-preservation," he added "is a paramount law," and this
is "not a time when any one connected with the judicial department"
should in any way "embarrass or thwart the executive in his efforts to
deliver the country from the dangers which press so heavily upon it."
In the face of a rebellion, Leavitt argued, "the president.., is invested
with very high powers," and "in deciding what he may rightfully do"
under these powers, "the president is guided solely by his own judg-
ment and discretion, and is only amenable for an abuse of his author-
ity by impeachment. '65
Turning to the specific circumstances at issue, Judge Leavitt ob-
served that "[a]rtful men, disguising their latent treason under hollow
pretensions of devotion to the Union," 66 have been "striving to dis-
seminate their pestilent heresies among the masses of the people. 67
Because the "evil was one of alarming magnitude," General Burnside
was reasonable in perceiving "the dangerous consequences of these
disloyal efforts" and in resolving, "if possible, to suppress them. 68
Noting that "there is too much of the pestilential leaven of disloyalty
in the community," Judge Leavitt concluded that those who criticize
order had no such pedigree; it was not even based on an order of the President
or the Secretary of War. It originated with Ambrose Burnside, the command-
ing general of the military district of Ohio.... Martial law was the voice of
whichever general was in command .... Members of the armed forces are
naturally accustomed to being governed by such orders. But Vallandigham
was not a soldier; he was a civilian.
Rehnquist, supra note 23, at 68, 74; see also id. at 86 (explaining Roman legal maxim, nulla
poena sine lege, which prohibits any "punishment except pursuant to established law").
63 Vallandigham, 28 F. Cas. at 922-24.
64 Id. at 921.
65 Id. at 922.
66 Id. at 923.
67 Id.
68 Id.
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the government in time of crisis "must learn that they cannot stab its
vitals with impunity." 69
Although Vallandigham had declined to plead his case to the mil-
itary commission, he was quick to plead it to the public. From his
prison in Cincinnati, he issued a succession of statements declaring,
for example, "I am here in a military bastille for no other offense than
my political opinions. '' 70 Newspapers across the nation were "quick to
champion his basic right to freedom of speech, war or no war. '71
Vallandigham's arrest triggered a riot in Dayton, his hometown, where
a Democratic mob burned the building occupied by the local Republi-
can newspaper to the ground. Similar mass demonstrations followed
in almost every major Northern city.72
The Democratic press was livid. The Albany Argus described the
arrest as a "crime against the Constitution. ' 73 The Detroit Free Press
declared that if speakers may be jailed "because they are opposed to
the war or the conduct of it, the polls may be closed, or voters ex-
cluded from them, for the same reason. If it is disloyal to make a
speech against the war, it is doubly disloyal to vote for men who are
opposed to it. ''74
A month after Vallandigham's arrest, the Ohio Democratic Con-
vention enthusiastically nominated him for Governor.75 The Conven-
tion adopted a resolution maintaining that "rights guarantied [sic] to
[the People] by their Constitution are their rights in time of war as
well as in times of peace, and of far more value and necessity in war
than in peace, for in peace, liberty, security, and property are seldom
69 Id. at 923-24. The Supreme Court declined to review the merits of the decision of the
military commission. See Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. 243 (1863).
70 Foote, supra note 14, at 633.
71 Id. For the full text of Vallandigham's address, see Klement, supra note 1, at 163-64.
72 See Klement, supra note 1, at 160-61,179-80.
73 Curtis, supra note 28, at 320 (quoting The Arrest of Vallandigham, Albany Argus,
May 8, 1863, at 2).
74 Id. at 324 (quoting The Military Discretion, Detroit Free Press, Jun. 10, 1863, at 2).
75 Political success awaited others who gained notoriety during the war for being per-
ceived as unjustly imprisoned. Dr. Israel Blanchard, imprisoned after being accused of
attending a Copperhead meeting and, while in attendance, making "disloyal remarks," was
elected the following year "as a state senator on the Democratic ticket." Mark E. Neely,
Jr., The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties 54-55 (1991). Dr. Edson B.
Olds, the "editor of the outspoken Ohio Eagle," was arrested and imprisoned on the or-
ders of Secretary of War Stanton. After languishing in solitary confinement while Lincoln
ignored petitions on his behalf, he was elected to a vacant seat in his home district by "the
largest vote ever given to a candidate in Fairfield County." Olds's victory "embarrassed
the administration, and the secretary of war ordered his quiet release." Klement, supra
note 1, at 118-19.
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endangered, in war, they are ever in peril."'76 Democrats, such as
Congressman Daniel Voorhees of Indiana, charged that Lincoln had
effectively reintroduced the Sedition Act of 179877 but without even
the authority of an act of Congress to support him. 78
Some Republican officials and newspapers praised General Or-
der No. 38 and Vallandigham's arrest and conviction. The Cincinnati
Commercial, for example, argued that "Order 38... is not designed to
abridge the liberty of the individual, where that liberty is not used to
the detriment of the Government. ' 79 The Chicago Tribune reasoned
that although free speech could be tolerated as a "harmless right" in
times of peace, this was not appropriate "in times of war and revolu-
tion."' 80 Ohio Senator John Sherman found it remarkable that a na-
tion in the midst of a great war should concern itself at all with
protective procedures for loyal citizens, much less openly disloyal
ones.
81
Other Republican voices, however, were critical. The New York
Daily Tribune noted that "our Federal and State Constitutions do not
recognize perverse opinions, nor unpatriotic speeches, as grounds of
infliction."'82 The New York Evening Post described free speech as
essential to "popular Government" and declared that "no govern-
ments and no authorities are to be held as above criticism. ' 83 The
Bedford Standard announced that we must "have faith in the power of
76 Curtis, supra note 28, at 324 (quoting Vallandigham Nominated for Governor:
George E. Pugh's Speech, Cincinnati Daily Com., Jun. 12, 1863, at 2).
77 The Sedition Act of 1798 prohibited "false, scandalous and malicious writing or writ-
ings against the government of the United States, or either house of the Congress of the
United States, or the President of the United States, with intent to defame [them] ... or to
bring them ... into contempt or disrepute; or to excite against them .. the hatred of the
good people of the United States." Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 74, § 2, 1 Stat. 596 (1798)
(repealed 1801). On the Sedition Act of 1798, see Geoffrey R. Stone, Louis M. Seidman,
Cass R. Sunstein & Mark V. Tushnet, Constitutional Law 997-98 (4th ed. 2001); see also
James M. Smith, Freedom's Fetters: The Alien and Sedition Laws and American Civil
Liberties (1956).
78 See History Repeats Itself-Persecution of Democrats Under the Old Sedition Law,
Detroit Free Press, Aug. 27, 1863, at 2; Speech of Daniel W. Voorhees (Sept. 15, 1863), in
Cincinnati Daily Com., Sept. 17, 1863, at 1; see also Curtis, supra note 28, at 325-26 (quot-
ing speech and citing article).
79 Curtis, supra note 28, at 319 (quoting Order Thirty-Eight, Cincinnati Daily Com.,
May 15, 1863, at 2).
80 Id. at 334 (quoting Military and Civil Law, Chi. Trib., Jun. 12, 1863, at 2).
81 Harold M. Hyman, A More Perfect Union: The Impact of the Civil War and Recon-
struction on the Constitution 262 (1973).
82 Vallandigham, N.Y. Daily Trib., May 15, 1863, at 4, quoted in Curtis, supra note 28,
at 327.
83 The Voice of Reason, Daily Nat'l Intelligencer, May 16, 1863, at 3 (reproducing col-
umn by New York Evening Post, which praised Burnside's actions as being "patriotic in
spirit" but called them "wrong" and fraught with "dangerous fallacies"); see also Curtis,
supra note 28, at 326 (quoting article).
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truth, and oppose those we believe to be in error with the weapon of
truth. ' 84  Even some Republican officials were critical. Senator
Trumbull of Illinois, for example, condemned Burnside's action be-
cause "we are fighting for the... preservation of the Constitution, and
all the liberties it guarantees to every citizen."'85
C. The Chicago Times
In June 1863, a month after Vallandigham's conviction, General
Burnside ordered Union soldiers to close the Chicago Times, which
had sharply criticized the Lincoln administration, the conduct of
the war, the Emancipation Proclamation and the arrest of
Vallandigham.86 The Times had denounced emancipation as a "mon-
strous usurpation" and "an act of national suicide" 87; asserted that
"soldier's lives" were being "sacrificed without cause" 88; editorialized
that "Negroes were destined to be 'mere hewers of wood and drawers
of water to a superior and dominant race' "89; characterized
Vallandigham's arrest as "the funeral of civil liberty" 90; and declared
that Union soldiers were "indignant at the imbecility that has devoted
them to slaughter for purposes with which they have no sympathy." 91
A week after Burnside assumed command of the Department of
Ohio, the Times published a purported letter to the editor from a
Union soldier at the front:
All the privations of a soldier's life could be easily borne-the long,
weary march through mud and rain, dust and heat-the blistered
feet and aching bones-with no provision other than hard bread
[and] no resting place but the damp earth, full of fevers, pain, and
84 Curtis, supra note 28, at 327 (quoting From the Bedford (Rep.) Standard, Detroit
Free Press, May 27, 1863, at 2).
85 Curtis, supra note 28, at 329 (quoting Senator Trumbull's Chicago Speech, Cincinnati
Daily Com., Jun. 11, 1863, at 2).
86 See Tenney, supra note 25, at 251.
87 Id. at 252 (quoting Chi. Times, Sept. 23, 1862, at 2).
88 Harper, supra note 17, at 258.
89 Tenney, supra note 25, at 251 (citing Chi. Times, Sept. 13, 1862, at 2). Referring to
the idea of colonization, the Chicago Times stated that "Negroes lacked 'manhood to gov-
ern and energy to work."' Id. The Times also leveled sharp political critiques at the ad-
ministration. In an editorial in May 1863, for example, it "likened the situation to the
period of the Alien and Sedition Acts, with the American public discovering that 'however
disreputable and contemptible [the administration's] measures, our people might be im-
prisoned or banished for truly, candidly and intelligently discussing them."' Id. at 252-53
(citing Chi. Times, May 30, 1863, at 2); cf. Speech of Daniel W. Voorhees, supra note 78
(comparing Lincoln's maneuvers to Sedition Act while proclaiming that "the black man
must be subject to the white man (us)" because "[h]e was born with no such capacity" to
build cities and machines or develop natural resources).
90 Tenney, supra note 25, at 252 (citing Chi. Times, May 27, 1863, at 2).
91 Id. at 251 (citing Chi. Times, Apr. 13, 1863, at 2).
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death .. were it the precursor of resuming peace and the restora-
tion of our old Union. But alas! the great bulk of the northern army
have been most grossly deceived.... I now know that it was only a
trap by which to get an immense army of patriotic men, who, once
in the clutch of an abolition administration, would be used by it,
against their will, to carry on an abolition crusade against the
South.... Each day sheds new light upon the darkness of the plot.92
As one commentator has sardonically observed, the Times's war
coverage and editorial policies were hardly "calculated to encourage a
rush on enlistment offices."' 93 The Republican governors of Illinois
and Indiana both complained to Secretary of War Stanton about the
Chicago Times on the ground that it was doing "incalculable injury" to
the Union cause, and General Burnside explained that his order to
suppress the Chicago Times was "on account of the repeated expres-
sion of disloyal and incendiary sentiments. '94
Upon learning of Burnside's order, Wilbur F. Storey, the forty-
year-old publisher and editor of the Times, who was viewed by
Republicans as the "very ogre of Copperheadism, '' 95 sought relief
from Federal Judge Thomas Drummond, who issued a temporary re-
straining order prohibiting Burnside from taking any action against
the Chicago Times until a full hearing could be held on the matter. 96
The judge observed that this is "a government of law and a govern-
ment of the Constitution, and not a government of mere physical
force. "97
The next morning, in direct disregard of Judge Drummond's or-
der, General Burnside ordered his troops to seize and close the office
of the Chicago Times.98 Burnside justified this action on the ground
that "freedom of discussion and criticism, which is proper .. in time
of peace, becomes rank treason when it tends to weaken" confidence
in the government in time of war. 99 Once again, there were public
protests, sharp criticism from the press, and angry demands that the
Lincoln administration rescind the order closing the Chicago Times.
A noon meeting of prominent Chicagoans, presided over by the
92 Id. (citing Chi. Times, Mar. 31, 1863, at 1). It is not clear whether such letters were
genuine or invented by the editors. See id.
93 Id.
94 General Order No. 84 (June 1, 1863), in 23 The War of the Rebellion, supra note 25,
ser. 1, pt. 2, at 381, 381; see also Tenney, supra note 25, at 253 (quoting General Order 84).
95 Frank L. Mott, American Journalism, a History: 1690-1960, at 357 (3d ed. 1962),
quoted in Harper, supra note 17, at 257.
96 See Curtis, supra note 28, at 315.
97 Id. (quoting Chicago Times Demonstration, Cincinnati Daily Com., Jun. 4, 1863, at
3).
98 Curtis, supra note 28, at 315.
99 Id.
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mayor, voted unanimously that the President should revoke the sus-
pension. Later that evening a crowd of 20,000, including many
Republicans, gathered to protest Burnside's conduct and to celebrate
the news that the Illinois legislature had denounced the General for
his conduct.' 00
II
ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND His CRITICS
Lincoln was embarrassed by Burnside's arrest of Vallandigham.
The former Ohio congressman was not the type of agitator Lincoln
expected the military to arrest. Throughout the conflict Lincoln's in-
ternal security policy was aimed primarily at deserters, draft dodgers,
bridge-burners, and others who gave concrete aid to the secessionists.
Vallandigham, however, was a Democratic Party leader who had been
arrested for a political speech. 10
Although Lincoln was disturbed by Burnside's action, he con-
cluded that he would do more harm by repudiating Burnside than by
upholding his action. Thus, upon learning of Vallandigham's arrest
and conviction, Lincoln, who tended to defer to his generals, wired
Burnside that he could count on the administration's support. 10 2 In an
effort to minimize the political consequences, however, Lincoln or-
dered Burnside to commute Vallandigham's sentence from imprison-
ment to banishment to the Confederacy. 0 3 Lincoln explained that the
purpose of "the original sentence of imprisonment... was to prevent
100 Foote, supra note 14, at 634.
101 Gideon Welles, Lincoln's Secretary of the Navy, declared that Vallandigham's im-
prisonment "was an error on the part of Burnside," while members of Lincoln's cabinet
doubted that the arrest was necessary and questioned the legitimacy of trying him before a
military commission. Gideon Welles, 1 Diary of Gideon Welles 306 (1911); see also
Donald, supra note 6, at 420; Neely, supra note 75, at 67; Rehnquist, supra note 23, at 73
("The argument for detaining someone like John Merryman, who had helped to burn the
railroad bridges that would bring troops through Baltimore to Washington, was much
stronger than that for arresting and trying Vallandigham, who had simply expressed views
strongly critical of the administration.").
102 Lincoln wrote Burnside, "All the cabinet regretted the necessity of arresting ...
Vallandigham, some perhaps, doubting, that there was a real necessity for it - but being
done, all were for seeing you through with it." Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Ambrose
E. Burnside (May 29, 1863), in Abraham Lincoln, Speeches and Writings, 1859-1865, at
451, 451 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed. 1989) [hereinafter Speeches and Writings]. The cabinet
took up the Vallandigham matter at its meeting on May 19, 1863. The general view was
that Burnside's action "had been a mistake," but that now that it had been done "there was
no way to back down." Rehnquist, supra note 23, at 67.
103 See McPherson, supra note 2, at 597. General Burnside protested this decision. He
argued that the military commission had fully discussed the option of banishment and de-
cided against it. Moreover, he argued that a change in the sentence would imply a criticism
of the "validity of the military commission." Lincoln rejected this plea. Klement, supra
note 1, at 177-78.
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[future] injury to the Military service," rather than to punish
Vallandigham, and that "the modification of [the order] ... was made
as a less disagreeable mode to him, of securing the same
prevention."'10 4
The President's commutation of Vallandigham's sentence did not
defuse the situation. This matter arose at a low point in the war for
the North. The Union had just suffered a devastating defeat at Chan-
cellorsville, and the public's confidence in the administration was
dwindling. As gloom settled over Washington, Democratic editors
launched a "blistering attack upon Burnside and Lincoln. ' 10 5 The
Iowa City State Press praised Vallandigham's nobility; the Ashland
Union predicted a dictatorship; and the Crisis characterized Lincoln's
decision as a "great blunder. ' 10 6 Other Democratic editors used such
phrases as "Caesar," "usurper," "demagogue," "tyrant," and "dicta-
tor" to describe the President.10 7 The Dubuque Herald declared that
"a crime has been committed against.., the right to think, to speak,
to live," and the Detroit Free Press complained that "Vallandigham
was arrested for no crime known to law." At a huge rally in New
York, one speaker proclaimed that if Lincoln did not reverse
Vallandigham's arrest "free speech dies, and with it our liberty, the
constitution and our country." Another speaker reminded Lincoln
that his own denunciation of President Polk during the Mexican War
was at least as strong as Vallandigham's criticism of him.10 8
The Republican press continued to chime in as well. The New
York Independent criticized the administration's "great mistake"; the
104 Letter from Abraham Lincoln to the Ohio Democratic Convention (June 29, 1863),
in Speeches and Writings, supra note 102, at 465, 468. Shortly after modifying
Vallandigham's "sentence" from imprisonment to banishment, Lincoln offered even to
cancel Vallandigham's exile. There was, however, a catch. In response to a petition from
the Ohio Democratic Convention asking him to reverse Vallandigham's conviction on the
ground that it violated the Constitution, a proposition Lincoln firmly rejected, Lincoln pro-
posed a deal. He implied in terms that could not be misunderstood, that the authors of the
petition might themselves be guilty of encouraging "desertion, resistance to the draft and
the like" because of their nomination of Vallandigham as the Democratic candidate for
Governor-an implication, in the circumstances, not to be taken lightly. Lincoln then pro-
posed, no doubt with some considerable sarcasm, that if they would sign their own petition
and return it to him, "with the understanding that those signing are thereby [publicly]
committed [not to] ... do any thing ... to hinder the increase, or favor the decrease, or
lessen the efficiency of the army or navy, while engaged in the effort to suppress the rebel-
lion," he would revoke "the order in relation to Mr. V." Id. at 469-70.
105 Klement, supra note 1, at 178.
106 Id. (citing various publications).
107 Id. at 178-79.
108 Donald, supra note 6, at 420. In 1847 and 1848, Lincoln was one of the most vehe-
ment critics of the Mexican War, challenging President Polk to prove that it was Mexico
rather than the United States that initiated the conflict. See id. at 122-28.
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Anti-Slavery Standard chastised the government for its "blunder"; and
the New York Sun observed that although "the Union can survive the
assaults" of the South, "it cannot long exist without free speech and
free press."'10 9.
A. The Albany Resolves
Democrats held protest meetings in almost every Northern city to
denounce the President's action. Among these many meetings, the
most important was held in Albany on May 16, 1863. The leaders of
this rally demanded to know whether the Civil War was being waged
to restore the Union or "to destroy free institutions" in the North. At
the end of the meeting, the leaders adopted ten resolutions against the
Lincoln administration, known as the "Albany Resolves." These reso-
lutions insisted that the nation and its President honor and protect the
liberties of citizens; assailed the military's arbitrary arrests of citizens
and its use of military commissions to try civilians; and maintained
that Vallandigham had been unlawfully convicted and exiled "for no
other reason than words addressed to a public meeting." 110 On May
19, after the Albany Resolves had been ratified by the entire meeting,
the presiding officer, Erastus Corning, sent them to Lincoln with a
request that he give his "earnest consideration" to the resolutions." 1
The Albany Resolves gave Lincoln an opportunity to explain his
position to the public. He prepared a lengthy and carefully crafted
reply that was intended as a state paper for broad dissemination.
Lincoln's goal was "to check the rising tide of public indignation
caused by Vallandigham's arrest, trial, and exile." 112 Lincoln's reply
merits careful attention because it provides rare insight into Lincoln's
views on the freedom of speech.
After crediting the authors of the resolutions with being "emi-
nently patriotic" in their "censure" of the actions of his administra-
tion, he contested the assertion that the arrest, conviction, and
banishment of Vallandigham was unconstitutional:
It is asserted ... that Mr. Vallandigham was, by a military com-
mander, seized and tried "for no other reason than words addressed
to a public meeting, in criticism of the course of the Administration,
and in condemnation of the Military orders of the General." Now,
if there be no mistake about this; if this assertion is the truth and the
whole truth; if there was no other reason for the arrest, then I con-
cede that the arrest was wrong. But the arrest, as I understand, was
109 See Klement, supra note 1, at 181 (citing sources as quoted in Crisis, May 27, 1863).
110 Id.; see also Harper, supra note 17, at 246.
111 Klement, supra note 1, at 181; see also Harper, supra note 17, at 247.
112 Klement, supra note 1, at 182.
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made for a very different reason. Mr. Vallandigham avows his hos-
tility to the War on the part of the Union; and his arrest was made
because he was laboring, with some effect, to prevent the raising of
troops; to encourage desertions from the army; and to leave the Re-
bellion without an adequate military force to suppress it. He was
not arrested because he was damaging the political prospects of the
Administration, or the personal interests of the Commanding Gen-
eral, but because he was damaging the Army, upon the existence
and vigor of which the life of the Nation depends. He was warring
upon the Military, and this gave the Military constitutional jurisdic-
tion to lay hands upon him. If Mr. Vallandigham was not damaging
the military power of the country, then his arrest was made on mis-
take of fact, which I would be glad to correct on reasonably satisfac-
tory evidence.
... Long experience has shown that armies cannot be maintained
unless desertions shall be punished by the severe penalty of
death .... Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts,
while I must not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to
desert? This is none the less injurious when effected by getting a
father, or brother, or friend, into a public meeting, and there work-
ing upon his feeling till he is persuaded to write the soldier boy that
he is fighting in a bad cause, for a wicked Administration of a con-
temptible Government, too weak to arrest and punish him if he
shall desert. I think that in such a case to silence the agitator, and
save the boy is not only constitutional, but withal a great mercy.113
Lincoln then turned to two key questions: How should the Con-
stitution apply in wartime? What about the concern that once we
compromise our liberties in wartime, we will lose them forever?
[T]he Constitution is not, in its application, in all respects the same,
in cases of rebellion or invasion involving the public safety, as it is in
time of profound peace and public security. The Constitution itself
makes the distinction [in the habeas corpus provision]; and I can no
more be persuaded that the Government can constitutionally take
no strong measures in time of rebellion, because it can be shown
that the same could not be lawfully taken in time of peace, than I
can be persuaded that a particular drug is not good medicine for a
sick man, because it can be shown not to be good food for a well
one. Nor am I able to appreciate the danger apprehended by [those
who drafted the Albany Resolves that] the American people will, by
means of military arrests during the Rebellion, lose the right of Pub-
113 Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Erastus Corning and Others (June 12, 1863), in
Speeches and Writings, supra note 102, at 454, 459-60. Lincoln added in passing that, "I do
not know whether I would have ordered the arrest of Mr. Vallandigham," but nonetheless
he believed that "the commander in the field is the better judge of the necessity in any
particular case." Id. at 462.
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lic Discussion, the Liberty of Speech and the Press,... throughout
the indefinite peaceful future, which I trust lies before them, any
more than I am able to believe that a man could contract so strong
an appetite for emetics during temporary illness as to persist in
feeding upon them during the remainder of his healthful life.' 4
B. The Ohio Resolves
At almost exactly the moment Lincoln was circulating his reply to
Erastus Corning, Ohio Democrats were meeting in Columbus to nom-
inate a candidate for Governor. Their overwhelming choice was
Clement Vallandigham, who was still, of course, in exile. The dele-
gates also approved twenty-three resolutions, which, for example, pro-
claimed that free government is endangered by military decrees;
challenged the legality of the Emancipation Proclamation and the sus-
pensions of the writ of habeas corpus; and condemned the conviction
and banishment of Vallandigham and demanded his release from ex-
ile. On June 22, the Ohio Democrats agreed that a delegation consist-
ing of nineteen members, representing each of the state's nineteen
congressional districts, should travel to Washington to present these
resolutions to the President. On June 25, Judge Mathias Birchard, the
chairman of the delegation, handed the resolutions to Lincoln in a
brief meeting at the White House.
On June 29, Lincoln published his reply. Although this message
covered much of the same terrain as his June 12 response to the Al-
bany Resolves, it elaborated his view of the Vallandigham situation:
You claim ... that according to my own position in the Albany
response, Mr. V. should be released; and this because, as you claim,
he has not damaged the military service, by discouraging enlist-
ments, encouraging desertions, or otherwise .... I certainly do not
know that Mr. V. has specifically, and by direct language, advised
against enlistments, and in favor of desertion, and resistance to
drafting. We all know that combinations, armed in some instances,
to resist the arrest of deserters, began several months ago ....
These had to be met by military force, and this ... has led to blood-
shed and death. And now, under a sense of responsibility more
weighty and enduring than any which is merely official, I solemnly
declare my belief that this hindrance, of the military, including
maiming and murder, is due to the course in which Mr. V. has been
engaged, in a greater degree than... to any other one man. These
things have been . .. known to all, and of course known to Mr.
V.... When it is known that the whole burthen of his speeches has
been to stir up men against the prossecution [sic] of the war, and
114 Id. at 460-61.
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that in the midst of resistance to it, he has not been known, in any
instance, to counsel against such resistance, it is next to impossible
to repel the inference that he has counseled directly in favor of it. 1 1 5
III
ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
After reading these letters, almost every lawyer will ask: What
standard would Lincoln apply for the suppression of speech in war-
time? Lincoln clearly endorses the proposition that the Constitution
governs in times of war as well as in times of peace, but he also em-
braces the view that the Constitution may be different in "applica-
tion" in these different circumstances. He derives this largely from
the habeas corpus provision of the Constitution, which allows the writ
to be suspended in time of "Rebellion or Invasion." 116 Because he is
concerned exclusively in these letters with the limits of dissent in war-
time, we cannot infer anything definitive about his view of this issue in
peacetime.
A careful reading of these letters, however, suggests several sig-
nificant propositions about free speech in wartime. First, at least in
wartime, Lincoln clearly does not accept the literalist position that
"Congress shall make no law .. abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press. 1117 If he had accepted this understanding of the First
Amendment, he necessarily would have overturned Vallandigham's
conviction.
Second, Lincoln emphasizes that had Vallandigham been con-
victed "for no other reason than words addressed to a public meeting,
in criticism of the course of the Administration," then "I concede that
115 Abraham Lincoln, Reply to the Ohio Democratic Convention (June 29, 1863), in
Speeches and Writings, supra note 102, at 465, 468-69. Lincoln then turned his sights di-
rectly on the Ohio Democrats. In effect, he asserted that by nominating Vallandigham as
their candidate for Governor, "your own attitude .. encourages desertion, resistance to
the draft and the like, because it teaches those who incline to desert, and to escape the
draft, to believe it is your purpose to protect them." To rebut this inference, he invited
them to declare that use of military force to suppress the rebellion is constitutional and
that they will do everything in their power to support the military forces of the Union. He
promised that if they were to make such a declaration, he would lift Vallandigham's sen-
tence of exile. Id. at 469-70.
Judge Birchard responded to this part of Lincoln's reply, "expressing surprise that the
president impugned the loyalty of those who did not agree with him or who opposed ad-
ministration measures," and arguing that Vallandigham "was entitled to his rights-they
were not a favor held in the hands of the president." Letter from Matthew Birchard et al.
to Abraham Lincoln (July 1, 1863) (on file with the Abraham Lincoln Papers, Library of
Congress), http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/P?mal:10:./temp/-ammem-3oUD::; see
Klement, supra note 1, at 189 (quoting letter).
116 U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
117 U.S. Const. amend. I.
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the arrest was wrong." 118 This is an important concession. It states
unequivocally that, even in wartime, the government cannot constitu-
tionally punish a speaker for criticizing the policies, programs, or ac-
tions of the government, regardless of their potential to interfere with
the activities of the military.
Third, Lincoln asserts that this was not the situation presented in
Vallandigham's case, for "the arrest, as I understand, was made for a
very different reason." 119 Vallandigham was arrested "because he was
laboring, with some effect, to prevent the raising of troops; to en-
courage desertions from the army; and to leave the Rebellion without
an adequate military force to suppress it. ''120 This is a complicated
sentence. A critical ambiguity is whether "laboring" implies that
Vallandigham was expressly advocating desertion and refusal of induc-
tion, or whether it implies only that he was intending to cause such
results. 121
There is no definitive way to answer this question from the text of
the June 12 letter, but there is good reason to believe that at the time
Lincoln wrote his reply to Erastus Corning he believed that
Vallandigham had expressly advocated unlawful conduct. Such ex-
pression was not uncommon among the more rabid Democrats during
the war, and Lincoln was sufficiently concerned with Vallandigham to
help engineer his defeat in the 1862 congressional election. 122 Moreo-
ver, two months earlier, in March 1863, the New York Times had inac-
curately reported that Vallandigham had counseled resistance to the
Conscription Act. It was this article in the Times that led to
Vallandigham's angry letter to the editor correcting the report and re-
affirming that he was "for obedience to all laws" and for "forcible
resistance to none. ' 123 Lincoln was apparently aware of the Times
article that inaccurately reported Vallandigham's New York speech,
and it presumably shaped his assumptions about Vallandigham's later
speech in Ohio. 124
118 Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Erastus Corning and Others, supra note 113, at
459-60. See supra text accompanying note 113 for the letter quoted at length.
119 Id.
120 Id. (emphasis added).
121 This turns out to be an important distinction in the evolution of First Amendment
jurisprudence. See Stone et al., supra note 77, at 1005-44.
122 See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
123 N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1863, at 1, quoted in Klement, supra note 1, at 135; see supra
note 53 and accompanying text.
124 See Klement, supra note 1, at 135, 175. In fact, express advocacy of law violation
would have been completely inconsistent with Vallandigham's long record as a public
speaker, and the most credible witness to the Ohio speech, Congressman S.S. Cox, testified
before the military commission that Vallandigham "had not counseled resistance to the
laws." See Rehnquist, supra note 23, at 66.
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Fourth, another significant ambiguity in Lincoln's statement-
that Vallandigham had been arrested "because he was laboring, with
some effect, to prevent the raising of troops; to encourage desertions
from the army; and to leave the Rebellion without an adequate mili-
tary force to suppress it" 125-concerns the phrase "with some effect."
Is it essential, in Lincoln's view, that the speech have "some effect" in
order to justify its suppression? If so, how much effect? In the June
12 letter to Erastus Corning, Lincoln did not elaborate on this. But in
his June 29 letter to the Ohio Democrats, he emphasized his belief
that "hindrance of the military, including maiming and murder, is
due" more to the speeches of "Mr. V." than to "any other one
man."'1 26 This is a powerful condemnation (whether warranted or not)
and suggests that the banishment of Vallandigham was justified in
Lincoln's mind in no small part because of what he perceived to be its
demonstrably dangerous "effect."
Fifth, a critical, if unstated, assumption of Lincoln's June 12 mes-
sage is that Vallandigham could not constitutionally be exiled, even in
wartime, if he did not intend to precipitate unlawful conduct. This
assumption follows both from Lincoln's use of the word "laboring"
and from his assurance that Vallandigham's conviction would have
been "wrong" if it was "for no other reason than words addressed to a
public meeting, in criticism of the course of the Administration." Had
Vallandigham merely been negligent in condemning the war in cir-
cumstances where members of the audience might be demoralized, he
could not be accused of "laboring" to bring about this effect.
Sixth, Lincoln seems clearly taken aback by the claim by the Ohio
Democrats that, according to his "own position in the Albany re-
sponse, Mr. V. should be released. ' 127 Their argument is that
Vallandigham had not discouraged enlistments or encouraged deser-
tion, as Lincoln had assumed in his June 12 message. To this Lincoln
defensively concedes that "I certainly do not know that Mr. V. has
specifically, and by direct language, advised against enlistments, and
in favor of desertion, and resistance to drafting.' 128 If Lincoln
thought that express advocacy of law violation was essential to the
suppression of Vallandigham's speech, he either would have conceded
that the conviction was "wrong" or sought additional facts. That he
125 Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Erastus Corning and others, supra note 113, at 459-
60 (emphasis added).
126 Lincoln, Reply to the Ohio Democratic Convention, supra note 115, at 468-69; see
supra text accompanying note 115 for Lincoln's Reply quoted at length.
127 Id.
128 Id.
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did neither makes clear that he did not think express advocacy
necessary.
That still leaves Lincoln with the problem of finding intent. And
that is precisely where he turns next. Lincoln argues not only that
Vallandigham's speeches were more harmful than those of "any other
one man," but also that the harm caused by his speeches was "of
course known to Mr. V.'' 129 Thus, Lincoln relies upon circumstantial
evidence to justify his characterization of Vallandigham's intent:
When it is known that the whole burthen of his speech has been to
stir up men against the prosecution of the war, and that in the midst
of resistance to it, he has not been known, in any instance, to coun-
sel against such resistance, it is next to impossible to repel the infer-
ence that he has counseled directly in favor of it.130
Lincoln does not contend that Vallandigham is guilty merely be-
cause he should have known that one effect of his expression might
have been to foster discontent and possibly cause desertion and re-
fusal of induction. To the contrary, Lincoln seems to understand that
such a position would be incompatible with his view that
Vallandigham could not be punished "for no other reason than words
addressed to a public meeting, in criticism of the course of the Admin-
istration.' 31 As Lincoln appears to recognize, any such criticism will
inevitably contribute to discontent and therefore some possible deser-
tion and refusal of duty.132
To escape this dilemma, Lincoln finds a middle ground. He ar-
gues that Vallandigham can justly be held responsible, not because his
speech criticized the administration, but because, knowing the danger
he created, he did not "counsel against" unlawful resistance to the
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Erastus Corning and others, supra note 113, at 459-
60.
132 Lincoln is thus more advanced in his thinking about the dynamics of free speech than
most of the federal courts that interpreted the First Amendment during World War I. See
Geoffrey R. Stone, The Origins of the Bad Tendency Test: Free Speech in Wartime, 2002
Sup. Ct. Rev. (forthcoming). For example, in Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919),
the popular Socialist leader Eugene V. Debs was convicted under the Espionage Act for
giving an antiwar speech at a rally in Canton, Ohio. Writing for a majority of the Court,
Justice Holmes upheld the conviction and ten-year sentence, reasoning that, in context, the
speech had the "natural tendency and reasonably probable effect" to obstruct recruiting.
Id. at 216. In a strange parallel to Vallandigham who ran for Governor of Ohio from exile,
see infra note 145 and accompanying text, Debs ran for President from prison, garnering
over 900,000 votes in the 1920 election. He was pardoned in 1921 by President Harding.
For information on Debs's life, see generally the Official Site of the Eugene V. Debs Foun-
dation, at http://www.eugenevdebs.com/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2003). For the text of Debs's
Canton Speech, go to Great American Speeches, at http://www.pbs.org/greatspeeches/
timeline/#1910 (last visited Mar. 3, 2003).
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law. In effect, following Lincoln's reasoning, a speaker like
Vallandigham could, in theory, both criticize the government and miti-
gate the danger that his speech might be misconstrued by expressly
discouraging unlawful conduct. This is an interesting argument, but it
surely has no fair application to "Mr. V.," who consistently counseled
against such resistance, 133 a fact of which the President presumably
was unaware.
Finally, there is Lincoln's famous hypothetical about the "simple-
minded soldier boy."'1 34 This example has been praised as a "stroke of
genius" because it seemed rhetorically unanswerable. 135 How, after
all, could the President justify shooting a "simple-minded soldier boy"
for deserting while not touching "a hair of a wily agitator who induces
him to desert"? In such a case, Lincoln maintained, "to silence the
agitator, and save the boy is not only constitutional, but withal a great
mercy."
If one wants to quarrel with Lincoln's reasoning in this instance,
there is plenty of opportunity to do so. If the soldier boy is truly "sim-
ple-minded," perhaps the government should not execute him for de-
sertion.136 That would be a "great mercy" without sacrificing anyone's
right to criticize the government. Moreover, to restrict freedom of
expression because of the possible reactions of the most susceptible
members of the audience runs the risk, as Justice Frankfurter once
observed, of reducing "the adult population... to reading only what is
fit for children. 1 37
Whatever the arguable deficiencies of Lincoln's analysis in these
messages, they demonstrate a serious effort to think through hard
First Amendment questions at a level of detail and with a degree of
scrutiny that was unprecedented at this time. Although the debates
over the Sedition Act of 1798 were often stunningly eloquent and
deeply insightful, they rarely approached this level of analytic rigor.
These letters show Lincoln not only as a brilliant politician and rheto-
rician but as an effective constitutional lawyer as well.
133 See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
134 See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
135 Klement, supra note 1, at 183.
136 Cf. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that execution of mentally re-
tarded criminals is "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibited by Eighth Amendment).
137 Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957). Justice Stevens referenced Justice
Frankfurter's comment in his majority opinion in Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521
U.S. 844 (1996) (criticizing vagueness and overbreadth of two provisions of Communica-
tions Decency Act of 1996, which sought to protect minors from harmful material on In-
ternet), and then in dissent in Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 604-05
(2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (questioning overbreath of Child Online Protection Act,
which Congress designed to correct constitutional defects in Communications Decency
Act).
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So, what constitutional "standard" does Lincoln embrace for the
restriction of seditious speech in wartime? We can infer that Lincoln
would uphold such a restriction if three conditions are satisfied: (1)
the speaker specifically intends to cause unlawful conduct; (2) the
speech will seriously interfere with the activities of the military; and
(3) the speaker does not expressly discourage unlawful conduct. If
this is, in fact, the "standard" Lincoln contemplated in these messages,
it would represent a substantial step forward from the Sedition Act of
1798.138
Lincoln's letters to Erastus Corning and the Ohio Democrats
were published throughout the nation, and the response was generally
enthusiastic. It is estimated that these letters were read by as many as
ten million people. 139 John Nicolay and John Hay, Lincoln's private
secretaries, later reported that they were among the most successful of
Lincoln's state papers in terms of their "impression upon the public
mind." 140
The public protests to Burnside's actions against Vallandigham
and the Chicago Times did not pass unnoticed in the White House.
When Burnside closed the Chicago Times, a month after the
Vallandigham arrest, Lincoln responded immediately. 141 Secretary of
War Stanton wrote Burnside that the President "directs me to say that
in his judgment it would be better for you to take an early occasion to
revoke that order" because the "irritation produced by such acts is in
his opinion likely to do more harm than the publication would do."'1 42
Stanton added that, in the future, on such questions as "the suppres-
sion of newspapers not requiring immediate action the President
138 Of course, it is impossible to know whether this is the "standard" that Lincoln con-
templated. We know only that he was prepared to exile an individual whose expression
(he believed) satisfied these three conditions. We do not know that he would not have
banished or punished others whose speech did not satisfy one or more of these conditions.
Certainly, not every person arrested during the Civil War for their expression met these
conditions. One of Lincoln's failings in this regard is that he never did make clear to
subordinates the ground rules that were to govern such matters. For discussion of the
Sedition Act of 1798, see supra note 77.
139 See Donald, supra note 6, at 444.
140 7 John G. Nicolay & John Hay, Abraham Lincoln: A History 349 (New York, Cen-
tury Co. 1890), quoted in Neely, supra note 75, at 68.
141 It is not clear that Lincoln's prompt response was guided by a clear-cut sense of
principle. Lincoln certainly vacillated about this decision. A year later, he recalled that he
had been "'embarrassed with the question between what was due the military service on
the one hand, and the liberty of the press on the other."' Tenney, supra note 25, at 256; see
also Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Isaac N. Arnold (May 27, 1864), in Lincoln, Col-
lected Works, supra note 10, at 363, 364 ("I am far from certain to-day that the resolution
revocation was not right.")
142 J.G. Randall, Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln 495 (1951).
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desires to be previously consulted."'1 43 The Chicago Times was
promptly allowed to resume publication.144
And what of Vallandigham? Ironically, Mr. V. was not welcome
in the Confederacy because he considered himself a loyal citizen of
the Union. He was therefore shipped to the West Indies, from where
he made his way to Canada. Having in the interim been nominated as
the Democratic candidate for Governor of Ohio, he campaigned vig-
orously, but unsuccessfully, from across the border.145 A year later,
Vallandigham returned to the United States, "wearing false hair on his
face and a large pillow strapped beneath his waistcoat,"146 in disregard
of the warning that the original sentence of imprisonment would be
imposed if he violated the terms of his commutation. By this time,
Lincoln had learned the lessons of experience, so he chose simply to
ignore Vallandigham's presence. In July 1864, Vallandigham played a
key role in drafting the Democratic Party's platform, which included
planks condemning the government's "arbitrary military arrests" and
its "suppression of freedom of speech and of the press. 147
IV
THE CONSTITUTION MATTERED
At the outset of the Civil War, the United States had had little
experience with "the freedom of speech, and of the press" in time of
war. In the sixty years since the Sedition Act of 1798, there had been
almost no federal restrictions on free expression, and there was thus
143 Id. It has been noted that "had there been any element of urgency in transmitting
the president's message, Stanton would have telegraphed it." Instead, Stanton sent the
message by mail, and even "then only after a few days had passed." Thus, "Burnside had
no immediate knowledge that his action against the Times had evoked Lincoln's displea-
sure." This gave Lincoln more time to test "the political waters swirling about the Times
affair and then take whatever administrative or political action might seem prudent-even
letting the suppression order stand." Tenney, supra note 25, at 253-54, 257. Moreover,
despite the final outcome in this incident, it has been argued that it "was not a tender
regard for the First Amendment that guided Lincoln's hand in signing the order lifting the
suppression. It was something more basic to the president's nature-a regard for politics."
Id. at 249.
144 Although Lincoln's action was generally applauded, it did not escape criticism.
Joseph Medill of the Chicago Tribune protested Lincoln's revocation of Burnside's order
as "a most unfortunate blunder." It is, he declared, "a triumph of treason." Harper, supra
note 17, at 261.
145 Vallandigham was defeated "by more than one hundred thousand votes," giving his
opponent "the greatest majority for governor in any state up to that time." Id. at 251.
146 Foote, supra note 14, at 634.
147 McPherson, supra note 2, at 771-72. For the platform adopted at the 1864 Demo-
cratic National Convention, see Edward McPherson, The Political History of the United
States of America During the Great Rebellion app. at 419-20 (Washington, D.C., Philp &
Solomons, 2d ed. 1865). For a full account of Vallandigham's life after his conviction by the
military commission, see Klement, supra note 1, at 190-313.
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no developed understanding of the permissible limits of dissent.148
Some constitutional scholars of the era thought that "there is some-
thing exquisitely absurd in the supposition that a civil .. war can be
waged under the protection of the Bill of Rights. ' 149 Others argued
that the Constitution should "apply as if nothing going on since
Sumter was different from what obtained earlier." Lincoln managed
to chart a middle course. 50
The nation did not enact a Sedition Act during the Civil War,
most dissent was left undisturbed, and most individuals who were ar-
rested for their expression were quickly released. 15' Moreover, as
Professor Michael Curtis has observed, "[t]he high public regard for
freedom of speech and concern for the relation of free speech to pop-
ular government" during the Civil War kept the tendency towards re-
pression in check. 152 Indeed, even "many Republicans... stood up to
protect" the rights of Vallandigham and other dissenters, "believing
that assaults on the tradition [of free expression] ultimately
threatened the liberty of all."' 153
In his single-minded devotion to keeping "the country whole so
that democracy could not be said to have failed,"154 Lincoln melded
his deep sense of the practical with his lifelong commitment to the
law. He claimed for himself-as President-powers both unprece-
dented and extraordinary, but he took care to root these claims of
148 As one nineteenth-century scholar explained:
The American people are engaged in a great struggle, in the progress of which
they begin to be, for the first time, thrown upon the serious discussion of the
most fundamental and vital principles of ... constitutional liberty .... They
have lived so long in the almost unparalleled enjoyment of liberty, but have
realized no occasion to study it, and have not analyzed or defined it.
Robert L. Breck, Habeas Corpus and Martial Law 9-10 (1862), quoted with alterations in
Hyman, supra note 81, at 72.
149 John N. Pomeroy, An Introduction to the Constitutional Law of the United States
379 (Cambridge, Riverside Press 1886).
150 See Hyman, supra note 81, at 99-101; Randall, supra note 142, at 31 (arguing that it
was fundamental to Americans during Civil War "to admit that the Constitution is binding
during war and yet to maintain that it sanctions extraordinary powers" when they are
needed). For a more negative assessment, see Neely, supra note 75, at 73 (arguing that
"[q]uestions of legal and constitutional form ... took a back seat in the Lincoln
administration").
151 See Hyman, supra note 81, at 72; Randall, supra note 142, at 152-53.
152 Curtis, supra note 28, at 352; Randall, supra note 142, at 46.
153 Curtis, supra note 28, at 353.
154 Neely, supra note 75, at 235. Lincoln saw the Civil War as dedicated to proving that
a "nation, conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created
equal,... can long endure" and to ensuring that "government of the people, by the people,
for the people, shall not perish from the earth." President Abraham Lincoln, Address at
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania (Nov. 19, 1863), in Speeches and Writings, supra note 102, at
536, 536.
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authority in the Constitution. Even at the darkest moments of the
Civil War, Lincoln never lost sight of the nation's most fundamental
values.155 What impresses most about his handling of the
Vallandigham affair was his persisting concern for harmonizing liberty
and power through constitutional discourse and his unflinching insis-
tence that "the Constitution mattered.' ' 56
155 See Gallman, supra note 7, at 194-95. The dominant view in the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries held that the executive could act outside the authority of the Consti-
tution in times of grave crisis. Representing this view, Charles Sumner declared that con-
stitutional rights must be "superseded by war, which brings into being other rights which
know no master." Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2196 (1862). Lincoln's approach was
more moderate, for he strained to connect his actions to the terms of the Constitution
itself. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Civil War as Paradigm: Reestablishing the Rule of Law at
the End of the Cold War, 5 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 129, 131-32 (1996).
156 Hyman, supra note 81, at 100-01.
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